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Executive Summary 
 
Section 1: The challenge is to establish permanent forest on vulnerable land throughout New 
Zealand, especially erosion-prone land and waterway margins (see Boxes 1 & 2). Leaving 
this land unforested hinders the nation’s long-term prosperity by degrading national 
environmental assets and increasing future carbon liabilities, which together, undermine 
New Zealand’s highly valued green reputation. 
Section 2: The proposed solution is a world-pioneering Permanent Forest Bond which belongs to 
the wider classes of green and climate-aligned bonds. The innovation is not only to fill a 
funding gap for budget-constrained government entities, it is to shift the environmental 
spending paradigm so that the New Zealand Government pays for positive environmental 
results rather than services. This shifts the risk of a successful intervention from 
taxpayers to private investors, who are compensated in return for taking the risk. 
Section 3: The foundations for the Permanent Forest Bond are based upon the idea of an 
Environmental Impact Bond, built upon pay-for-performance contracts. First conceived 
by David Nicola in a 2013 report, there have not yet been any bonds issued in New 
Zealand under this instrument. However, there are examples emerging in the United 
States, including a Forest Resilience Bond currently under development (see Box 3). 
Section 4: The Environmental Impact Bond is an extension of a Social Impact Bond, of which there 
are now over 60 issued worldwide. However, the impact bond model is better suited for 
environmental impacts than social impacts, particularly because measurement is less 
controversial and better established (see Box 4). 
Section 5: Although there is not yet any empirical track record for Environmental Impact Bonds, 
there is now an emerging empirical and evaluative literature on Social Impact Bonds. This 
literature is surveyed to anticipate the various advantages and risks of adapting this 
structure for establishing permanent forest.  
Section 6: A major advantage of Environmental Impact Bonds over Social Impact Bonds is the pre-
existing science and economics of monitoring and valuing environmental assets. This 
section draws upon existing literature on ecosystem services to identify the potential 
expenses, revenue streams and avoided costs that can be negotiated as part of a 
Permanent Forest Bond. 
Sections 7 & 8: A Permanent Forest Bond is an eminently feasible proposition. The impact bond 
structure is well suited to aligning the long-run costs and benefits of establishing forest 
(or not) on vulnerable land. 
Appendix 1: This innovative and world-leading Permanent Forest Bond is aligned to international 
trends, including divestment from fossil fuels, the growing green bonds market, and the 
international transition to a low-carbon economy through the Paris Agreement. 
Appendix 2: The Permanent Forest Bond is complementary to other schemes, filling funding gaps 
left by the Afforestation Grant Scheme and Permanent Forest Sink Initiative.  
  
 
 
Permanent Forest Bond Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For a detailed discussion of this model, turn directly to Section 7 (p. 26–30). 
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The Stars are Aligning... 
International Markets 
● Growing demand for green investment options. 
● Growing awareness of the scale and risks of stranded fossil fuel assets. 
● US$2.2 trillion capex in stranded fossil fuel assets to fit 2°C carbon budget 
● Growing public pressure to divest from fossil fuel investments. 
● Growing markets for green bonds and climate-aligned bonds. 
● US$694 billion of outstanding “climate-aligned bonds”. 
● Paris Green Bonds Statement to upscale green investment from investors worth US$11.2 
trillion of assets. 
 
Climate Change 
● The signing of the Paris Agreement for global net zero emissions by the second half of this 
century. 
● Growing awareness of future carbon liabilities if New Zealand meets emissions targets by 
purchasing foreign offsets. 
● Projected 2030 carbon price of between $56 and $152 per tonne (MBIE 2016; IEA World 
Energy Outlook 2015). 
● Growing recognition by the New Zealand Government of the role of afforestation for 
national climate strategy. 
● Reduced carbon sequestration from New Zealand’s plantation forests due to projected 
deforestation increases into the 2020s. 
 
Environmental Benefits for New Zealand 
● Renewed appreciation of the environment’s economic value through the ecosystem services 
framework. 
● Growing public concern about deteriorating water quality and the role of forest to mitigate 
this. 
● Growing need to build resilience to climate change. 
● Trees stabilise erosion prone land. 
● Trees mediate peak flood flows. 
● Trees absorb pollution that affect water and air quality. 
● Trees enrich indigenous biodiversity. 
 
(For a more detailed discussion, see Appendix 1.) 
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1: The Challenge 
 
The challenge is to increase the area of permanent forest in New Zealand. The priority is highly 
erosion-prone land and waterway margins, where permanent forest planting is environmentally 
beneficial (see Box 1 below for detail). This is the target land for afforestation. 
The environmental benefits of undertaking large-scale afforestation are uncontroversial. These 
benefits include land stabilisation, reduced soil loss, reduced nutrient runoff, management of water 
catchments, restoration of indigenous biodiversity, and sequestration of atmospheric carbon.1 
Afforestation of 1.1 million hectares or more of highly erosion prone land in pasture would prevent 
annual costs to New Zealand worth hundreds of millions of dollars due to erosion damage, reduced 
water quality, flooding, carbon offsetting and the degradation of New Zealand’s green brand  (see 
Section 6).  
Also, because much of this target land is (1) marginal for pastoral agriculture and (2) too remote or 
steep to be profitable for commercial forest, the trade-offs against economic productivity are minimal. 
Indeed, in some places, permanent forest will be the most productive land use by creating 
opportunities for carbon offsetting, honey production, selective timber felling, recreation, and so forth 
(see Box 1 below). 
The long-term economic case for afforestation is compelling. The major obstacles are present land 
values and the immediate expense of forest establishment. These costs appear to outweigh the 
economic benefits, especially for permanent forest, which foregoes predictable timber revenue from 
rotation cycles. However, while the costs of establishing permanent forest are internalised by 
landowners, the benefits of mature forest—as well as the costs of no forest—are externalised. In 
economic terminology, they are externalities that go unaccounted for by decision-makers, yet that 
impose accountable costs on local communities, on the national economy, and on future generations.  
From this wider perspective, the establishment of permanent forest is economically rational, even if 
it isn’t for individual landowners. The immediate costs of action—in this case, the planting of 
permanent forest on erosion prone land and waterway margins—are outweighed by the aggregate 
costs of inaction. The challenge is to find a financial instrument that captures these long-run costs and 
benefits.  
                                                        
1 For review, see David Hall, “Our Forest Future”, Report Prepared for Pure Advantage (Auckland: Pure 
Advantage, 2016): http://pureadvantage.org/news/2016/04/22/our-forest-future/ 
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Box 1: What kind of land is appropriate for a Permanent Forest Bond? 
 
The Permanent Forest Bond is not designed to compete for land that is economically profitable for 
agriculture, horticulture or forestry. The aim of the Bond is to broaden the land use options available to 
landowners by making permanent forest more attainable, especially where: 
 
(1) Land is marginal or minimally productive for agriculture and forestry. 
(2) Land is not marginal but landowners nevertheless plan to convert to permanent forest anyway 
because of personal choice or regulation. 
 
(1) Marginal land: There are a variety of reasons that land could be marginal or minimally productive for 
agriculture and forestry. In these instances, the revenue streams from permanent forest (carbon credits, 
mānuka honey, selective timber felling, etc.) might be more economically productive for landowners. This 
applies to:  
 pastoral land that is prone to erosion and therefore costly in terms of damage to property and 
fencing; 
 land that is too steep or rugged for safe, simple and cost-effective extraction of timber; 
 land that is very remote or distant from processing centres, thereby increasing transport costs and 
reducing profitability. 
 
(2) Planned conversion: There will also be instances where landowners plan to convert or retire land to 
permanent forest, even when this land is at least minimally productive for agriculture or forestry. In such 
cases, landowners are motivated to forego more economically optimal land uses because:  
 landowners are principally motivated by non-market values of permanent forest such as cultural, 
aesthetic or environmental reasons; 
 landowners are subject to regulation that encourages afforestation, either by central government, 
local authorities, or industry commitments. 
 
Note that permanent forest will not always be preferable, such as instances where riparian planting will 
reduce river catchment yields. 
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2: The Solution 
 
The solution explored in this working paper is creating a financial instrument that internalises these 
very long-run costs and benefits. This instrument will be called a Permanent Forest Bond. 
The underlying structure is analogous to a Social Impact Bond, insofar as it is built on pay-for-
performance contracts. This means that payment will be triggered only once pre-established impact 
performance targets are achieved. The Permanent Forest Bond is, therefore, potentially an example 
of an Environmental Impact Bond. 
In the case of permanent forest planting, this means that investors will only receive a return-on-
investment once the bond issuer is assured by third-party evaluators that a newly established forest 
has met agreed-upon environmental impacts. For example, these impacts could include x-number of 
trees per hectare after five years, y-tonnes of carbon per hectare, or a z-percentage decrease in 
phosphorous concentrations in freshwater samples. 
The issuer of the Permanent Forest Bond is Government, acting on behalf of the Crown. This is 
because the Crown (the state) is representative of the interests of all New Zealanders—past, present 
and future. It is therefore the most appropriate entity to take responsibility for very long-run costs 
and benefits, because it can justify these costs and benefits in its intergenerational accounts. As long 
as public spending reliably creates environmental assets and avoids predictable costs, present 
expenditure can be justified against long-run gains in value. 
From the Crown’s perspective, the Permanent Forest Bond provides a cost-efficient route to long-
run prosperity and fulfilling transgenerational obligations, as well as an opportunity to involve the 
private sector in environmental remediation. The Permanent Forest Bond is an example of a public-
private partnership, although one that contracts for outcomes rather than outputs. This enables the 
Crown to redistribute risk away from public funds and onto private investors, because the spending 
of public money is triggered only by the fulfilment of outcomes. Pay-for-performance contracts also 
permit innovation and experimentation through service delivery; and can leverage the expertise, 
talents, and resources of the private sector. 
From the perspective of private investors, the Permanent Forest Bond provides an attractive green 
investment opportunity. It belongs not only to the class of financial instruments known as 
Environmental Impact Bonds, but also more broadly to “green bonds” and “climate-aligned bonds”. 
So, rather than merely donate philanthropically, private sector investors are offered an investable 
opportunity with reasonable returns and an alignment to sustainability goals. 
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Box 2: Who might participate in a Permanent Forest Bond? 
Below are fictional but realistic examples of groups and individuals who might be interested in participating 
in a Permanent Forest Bond: 
 
—A community conservation group in Northland that wishes to undertake a habitat restoration project on a 
land section, yet lacks the finances to do so. The group is willing to accept the rigor of measurement and 
evaluation in order to access private investor capital as contractors for a Permanent Forest Bond. 
 
—A dairy farming family in the Waikato which has developed a riparian management plan as part of Dairy 
NZ’s Sustainable Dairying: Water Accord. They would willingly undertake riparian planting before the Accord’s 
2030 deadline, but currently lack the capacity to do so. They also support any initiative that creates 
employment opportunities for local workers. Accordingly, they are persuaded by the offer of a local social 
enterprise that employs ex-offenders as contractors for tree planting, which uses its proven record of success 
to access capital through the Permanent Forest Bond. 
 
—A Māori land trust on the East Coast that wants to replace existing exotic plantation forest with permanent 
native forest, to be managed as a continuous cover forestry regime in line with kaitiakitanga values. However 
the trust lacks the upfront capital to establish native forest, and also prefers not to enter into a covenant with 
the Crown, two reasons that weigh against the Permanent Forest Sink Initiative. The trust is also keen to trial 
out transitional regimes which strike the best balance between timber and carbon revenue with a long-term 
plan for native conversion.  
 
—A Manawatū sheep farming family who recognise that large blocks of their erosion prone land should be 
retired, following the damage caused by the 2015 storm. However they want forest conversion to occur more 
rapidly than by natural regeneration, so to generate carbon credits within their lifetimes. They are time-poor 
as well as cash-poor, their wealth tied up in the family farm, so they would need upfront capital to activate 
afforestation. Their applications to other funds, such as local council erosion control funds or QEII covenants, 
haven’t been successful. 
 
—A forest owner who has clear-felled a Pinus radiata forest in Golden Bay. The logs were exported overseas 
for minimal returns, so there is little incentive to restock. Moreover, the forest was on steep land, so 
inappropriate for dairy conversion. The cleared land is also now prone to slips and sediment loss. The forest 
owner would like to realise the local community’s aspirations for the land to be converted to native bush, to 
augment the region’s “green assets” for tourism and recreation. But the landowner cannot afford to invest in 
habitat restoration, needing to invest his returns elsewhere. 
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3: What is an Environmental Impact Bond? 
 
The proposed Permanent Forest Bond is a specific example of a larger class of assets called 
Environmental Impact Bonds (EIBs). This asset class is new, first articulated in a 2013 working paper 
by David Nicola. 
In his report, Nicola introduces the EIB as follows:2 
 
…an EIB will be defined as a “pay-for-performance” (PFP) contract that addresses an 
environmental issue. The PFP mechanism inherent in EIBs will be similar to that of SIBs [Social 
Impact Bonds], whereby the government (or another contracting entity) pays an agreed-upon 
return if impact performance targets, as specified in the investment contract, are met. EIBs tend 
to represent a “monetization” of future costs savings, whereby investors are paid a return based 
on the amount of cost savings generated by a particular project. Monetization of future cost savings 
is a staple of environmental finance. 
 
In very basic terms, this is how it works: Private investors transfer money to an intermediary. The 
intermediary uses this money to pay contractors to perform an environmental service (such as 
planting and protecting a new native forest). Third-party evaluators then monitor the real-world 
impacts of this environmental service to determine whether pre-established performance impact 
targets have been met. If, and only if, these targets are met, then government (and perhaps other 
non-governmental parties) will pay an agreed-upon sum to the intermediary. This money is then used 
to pay the return and a coupon to investors. See Figure 1 below. 
                                                        
2 David J. Nicola, “Environmental Impact Bonds,” Case i3 Working Paper #1 (Duke University, The Fuqua School 
of Business, 2013), 14. 
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Figure 1: Schema for an Environmental Impact Bond.3 
 
 
At the time of writing, there has been only one such bond issued in the United States: an 
Environmental Impact Bond issued by DC Water and Sewer Authority to control stormwater runoff 
and improve the District’s water quality.4 This $25 million tax-exempt EIB was issued on 29th 
September 2016 and sold to Goldman Sachs Urban Investment Group and the Calvert Foundation. 
The proceeds will be used to construct green infrastructure to slow rainwater surges into overflows. 
There is a mandatory tender set for 1st April 2021, when investors will be paid in line with their 
performance. They will receive a US$3.3 million coupon if runoff is reduced by over 41.3%; no coupon 
if runoff is reduced by 18.6%–41.3%; and  investors will pay a “risk share payment” of US$3.3 million 
of runoff is reduced by less than 18.6%. The final maturity is set for 1st October 2046. 
                                                        
3 This diagram is adapted from Emily Gustafsson-Wright, Sophie Gardiner, and Vidya Putcha, “The Potential 
and Limitations of Impact Bonds: Lessons from the First Five Years of Experience Worldwide” (Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, July 9, 2015), 6, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-potential-and-
limitations-of-impact-bonds-lessons-from-the-first-five-years-of-experience-worldwide/. 
4 District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority, “Fact Sheet: DC Water Environmental Impact Bond,” Public 
Utility Subordinate Lien Revenue Bonds Series 2016B (Washington, D.C.: District of Columbia Water and Sewer 
Authority, 2016). 
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Although this is being heralded as the first EIB in the United States, it is not the only EIB in 
development. Of special relevance to this working paper is a pilot project for a Forest Resilience Bond 
that reduces fire risk (see Box 3 below). The feasibility of this bond suggests that the EIB structure 
might be well-aligned to the challenge of establishing permanent forest. The following section, Section 
4, will survey the Social Impact Bond literature to illuminate its prospects. 
 
Box 3: Case study: The Forest Resilience Bond pilot project. 
A pilot project for a Forest Resilience Bond (FRB) is currently being undertaken by Blue Forest Conservation 
in the United States. It is being developed in partnership with Encourage Capital and the World Resources 
Institute, supported by philanthropic funding from the Rockefeller and Packard Foundations. 
The purpose of the FRB is to make national forests in the United States more resilient to climate change, 
specifically by removing forest litter to reduce the risk of severe wildfire and drought. This creates value for 
a diverse set of stakeholders, foremost the US Forest Service, which can reduce planned expenditure on 
future fire-fighting if it is confident that there is a reduced likelihood of future fire. Other beneficiaries include 
water and electric utilities and private water-dependent companies, which benefit from the prevention of 
drought- and fire-related erosion that results in worsening water quality and sedimentation. These 
contracting entities pay for these environmental benefits once agreed-upon impact performance targets are 
met.   
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As the diagram above shows, contracted cash flows are determined by third-party evaluators. The relevant 
mechanism is pay-for-performance contracts, whereby payment is triggered by outcomes that meet impact 
performance targets, supported by pre-established environmental indicators and measures. This evaluation 
framework is currently under development for the Blue Forest Conservation bond—but the intention is to 
develop a scalable verification method which identifies additional water quantity and quality benefits that 
result from forest restoration. This method will involve the integration of survey and satellite technology with 
model-based measuring techniques to identify actual-versus-projected differences in evapotranspiration, 
snowpack accumulation, and delivery of additional water through existing reservoirs and conveyance 
infrastructure. 
The pay-outs for meeting performance impact targets create the capital that investors receive as returns 
on investment. There are multiple ways that these returns can be structured, potentially as tranches that 
reflect an investor’s appetite for risk. 
Blue Forest Conservation advocates for the impact bond structure on the following grounds:  
 sharing of costs (and benefits) reduces aggregate costs to each individual stakeholder;  
 tapping private capital allows for amortization of costs over time, maximizing immediate restoration 
scale without stressing budgets;  
 and accelerating restoration treatments prevents further overgrowth and future costs to 
stakeholders.5 
                                                        
5 “Forest Resilience Bond,” Blue Forest Conservation, accessed October 14, 2016, 
http://blueforestconservation.com/#frb. 
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4: The Precursor: the Social Impact Bond. 
 
In his report, Nicola treats the EIB as homologous to the better known Social Impact Bond (or SIB). 
So, even though there is no empirical track record for EIBs to draw upon, we can turn to the literature 
on SIBs to identify the potential advantages and risks.  
Social Finance, an economic think tank that pioneered work on SIBs, describes these financial 
instruments as follows:6 
 
At its core, a Social Impact Bond is a public-private partnership which funds effective social services through a 
performance-based contract. Social Impact Bonds enable federal, state, and local governments to partner with 
high-performing service providers by using private investment to develop, coordinate, or expand effective 
programs. If, following measurement and evaluation, the program achieves predetermined outcomes and 
performance metrics, then the outcomes payor repays the original investment. However, if the program does 
not achieve its expected results, the payor does not pay for unmet metrics and outcomes.  
 
As of June 2016, there were 60 projects launched globally within the SIB category, including in the 
United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Portugal, 
India, Switzerland, Austria, Israel, Finland and Sweden. These have raised over US$200 million of 
capital and involved over 90,000 people in their service delivery.7  
Conventional histories trace the origins of SIBs to the Peterborough Prison Bond, issued by Social 
Finance in the United Kingdom (2010–2015). This was designed to reduce prisoner recidivism. It raised 
£5 million for providers to reduce reoffending among 2,000 former prisoners. In 2014, it was reported 
that the bond succeeded in reducing recidivism by 8.4%, not enough to trigger immediate repayment 
(this target was 10%), but on track to trigger repayment in 2016 (over 7.5%). However the Bond was 
disestablished in 2015, due to nation-wide policy reforms under the Transforming Rehabilitation 
programme, which made the Peterborough Prison Bond not only redundant but also contrary to 
incoming legislation.8  
In New Zealand, there is an active interest in social investment, whereby SIBs are being investigated 
as one mechanism for delivery. Former Finance Minister Bill English has argued that “social investment 
is a more rigorous and evidence-based feedback loop linking service delivery to a better understanding 
of people’s needs and indicators of the effectiveness of social services.”9 In 2013, the Ministry of 
Health commenced work on a “social bond” for the rehabilitation of people living with mental health 
                                                        
6 Annie Dear et al., “Social Impact Bonds: The Early Years” (Social Finance, July 2016), 12. 
7 Dear et al., “Social Impact Bonds: The Early Years.” 
8 Social Finance, “Peterborough Social Impact Bond Reduces Reoffending by 8.4%; Investors on Course for 
Payment in 2016,” Social Finance, July 8, 2014, http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/peterborough-social-impact-
bond-reduces-reoffending-by-8-4-investors-on-course-for-payment-in-2016/. 
9 Bill English, “Speech to the Treasury Guest Lecture Series on Social Investment,” The Beehive, September 17, 
2015, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-treasury-guest-lecture-series-social-investment. 
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issues. This pilot project has since stalled because the service provider withdrew from the project.10 
Work on a second social bond commenced in early 2016, with $29 million set aside for the rollout of 
four bonds in total. The Government remains committed to exploring this approach further. 
Around the world, however, many SIBs have gone beyond pilot phase. A recent report by Social 
Finance paints a cautiously optimistic picture. Of the 60 SIBs launched internationally between 2010 
and June 2016, 22 have reported performance data, 21 indicated positive social outcomes, 12 have 
made outcome payments, and 4 have fully repaid investor capital.11 The report authors argue that this 
first generation of SIBs offer “a promising, if early, record of success”, while acknowledging that this 
is informed by interim, not final, results.12 This is reinforced by an earlier Brookings Institute survey of 
38 SIBs which concluded that “it is very likely that the impact bond model development process, 
structure, and application will continue to be adapted in the future”.13 
However, it must be clearly stated that, because SIBs are a novel category of financial instrument, 
there is not yet an uncontroversial empirical record to evaluate their success. Moreover, current 
debates over the merits of SIBs are often infused with ethical or political objections, which complicates 
the conclusions drawn from empirical data. For example, the cessation of the Peterborough Prison 
Bond is occasionally used by critics as evidence that the impact bond model is intrinsically flawed, 
even though the SIB was discontinued because of wider policy reform.14 This does highlight the 
regulatory risks that SIBs are vulnerable to – perhaps even uniquely vulnerable to – but it does not 
serve as general proof that the SIB model is essentially flawed. 
Another frequent criticism is that SIBs are being rolled out as a replacement for existing programmes, 
perhaps even a substitute for core funding. However, the literature on SIBs does not endorse these 
structures as a substitute for conventional forms of social funding, nor as appropriate for all 
situations.15 Rather, SIBs are recommended as a potential funding route in situations: 
 where the intervention focus is preventative; 
 where there is a lack of upfront funding or political will for intervening; 
 where long-time horizons are acceptable to contracting parties; 
 where the most effective form of intervention is undetermined; 
 where government seeks innovation and private sector rigour in service provision; 
 where existing public spending has poor or undetermined outcomes; and 
 where the future financial and political cost-savings from intervening are substantial.  
                                                        
10 Kate Gudsell, “Government’s First Social Bond Collapses,” Radio New Zealand, July 6, 2016, 
http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/308026/government’s-first-social-bond-collapses. 
11 Dear et al., “Social Impact Bonds: The Early Years,” 6. 
12 Ibid., 26. 
13 Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha, “The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds,” 50. 
14 Emma Tomkinson, “The Peterborough Social Impact Bond (SIB) Conspiracy,” Emma Tomkinson, October 27, 
2014, https://emmatomkinson.com/2014/10/27/the-peterborough-social-impact-bond-sib-conspiracy/. 
15 This is a common claim in the literature, but for specific examples, see Jenesa Jeram and Bryce Wilkinson, 
“Investing for Success: Social Impact Bonds and the Future of Public Services” (Wellington, NZ: New Zealand 
Initiative, 2015), 5–6; Dear et al., “Social Impact Bonds: The Early Years,” 21; and Emily Gustafsson-Wright and 
Sophie Gardiner, “Policy Recommendations for the Applications of Impact Bonds: A Summary of Lessons from 
the First Five Years of Experience Worldwide” (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, November 2015), 3–
4, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-potential-and-limitations-of-impact-bonds-lessons-from-the-first-
five-years-of-experience-worldwide/. 
  11 
 
By contrast, SIBs are seen as unlikely to succeed in situations where:  
 where outcomes are diffuse; 
 where measurement is difficult or highly contestable; 
 where attribution of outcomes is complex due to confounding variables; 
 where knowledge and empirical evidence of intervention impacts is too scant to convince 
investors to risk their capital; 
 where the use of targets or metrics creates perverse incentives; 
 where there is uncertainty over whether the outcome funder (such as a government with a 
poor credit rating) can repay investors; 
 where there is a possibility for corruption at any stage; 
 where programmes are politically controversial over the SIB’s long lifespan; and 
 where government is already willing to fund conventional outcomes-based interventions that 
have proven effectiveness. 
 
This working paper follows the lead of such research by treating Environmental Impact Bonds as one 
instrument in the toolbox, not a panacea. In other words, this working paper will not advocate the 
impact bond model as adequate for all investments into environmental infrastructure, nor as an 
alternative to core funding for environmental management; rather, it explores the adequacy of this 
financial instrument for the particular challenge of planting permanent forest in New Zealand. 
Whether impact bonds can be successfully adapted for other environmental challenges—such as the 
DC Water and Sewer Authority bond for green infrastructure—is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The next section (Section 5) will adapt the SIB literature to the possibility of EIBs. For a direct 
discussion of why the obstacles for environmental bonds might not be faced by social bonds, see Box 
4 below. 
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Box 4: Why Social Impact Bonds Are Not Like Environmental Impact Bonds. 
The key difference between SIBs and EIBs is the object of impact: SIBs target sectors of society, such as 
offenders or underprivileged children, whereas EIBs target attributes of the natural environment, such as water 
quality or biodiversity. 
This basic difference has three important implications: (1) measuring impact for EIBs is less controversial than 
for SIBs; (2) EIBs can piggyback on established models and frameworks for monitoring and evaluation; and (3) 
EIBs can look to more diverse revenue streams than government. 
(1) Physical measurement is far less controversial than social measurement. Measuring improvements in 
mental health, for example, necessarily involves normative criteria such as “what is healthy?”, “what is 
socially acceptable?”, and “what is well-being?” Answering these questions involves not only methodological 
disputes, but also ethical and political disputes over what we consider “good” or “normal”. By contrast, 
measuring physical properties in an environment—say, the presence of particulates in air, or the volume of 
phosphorous in water—is relatively less controversial. Although we cannot avoid ethical and political disputes 
entirely—for instance, we still need to decide what are “safe” levels of particulates or phosphorous—we can 
at least more easily distinguish these issues from issues of measurement.  
 
(2) Unlike SIB metrics, which must be created from scratch and trialled over time, standardised EIB metrics 
generally already exist, or can be readily adapted, from existing technologies and frameworks for 
environmental monitoring and evaluation. This avoids a major disincentive for SIBs: that they are very costly 
and laborious to set up because of debates of measures of well-being. In regards to measuring the value and 
effects of permanent forest, however, New Zealand already has government systems in place that could be 
co-opted or adapted for the purposes of impact measurement, evaluation, baseline setting, the pricing of 
costs and benefits, and so on. Crown research institutes such as Landcare, Scion and NIWA are already 
involved in relevant science, including measurements of water quality, air quality, and land use surveys. The 
National Environmental Standards currently under development for the Ministry for the Environment, 
especially the framework being developed for plantation forests in collaboration with the Ministry for Primary 
Industries, could also be adapted to create impact performance targets for permanent forest planting.  
 
(3) The final strength of EIBs is that revenue streams are a regular occurrence for natural resources, whereas 
for SIBs the primary source of revenue is government. Specifically, the prime justification for public spending 
on SIBs is avoided costs to government, typically through the prevention of social harms that require public 
investment. However, when the object of impact is natural resources, the value could also accrue to private 
companies, such as the water and electricity utilities in the forest resilience bond. For permanent forest, 
revenue could potentially come from selective timber felling, honey production, carbon offsetting, 
recreation, and so on (although the trade-off for more diverse revenue is the overall complexity and risk of 
the instrument).   
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5: Environmental Impact Bonds: Advantages and Risks. 
 
This next section draws upon the existing literature on SIBs to survey the advantages and risks of this 
financial structure, adapting this analysis to the hypothetical case of a Permanent Forest Bond.16 
The advantages are as follows: 
 Risk is displaced from the public sector to private investors (§5.1.1). 
 Auditing and monitoring are built into the funding structure (§5.1.2). 
 Emphasis on measurement, cause and effect (§5.1.3). 
 Emphasis on long-term outcomes (§5.1.4). 
 Potential for long-term fiscal savings from future avoided costs (§5.1.5). 
 The provision of upfront capital is part of the instrument (§5.1.6). 
 Potential for greater innovation and more cost-effective service provision (§5.1.7). 
 Potential to harness expertise and reputation of private investors and intermediaries 
(§5.1.8). 
 Potential for scalability (§5.1.9). 
 Potential for more successful achievement of outcomes (§5.1.10). 
 Potential to harness philanthropic and prosocial motivations among investors (§5.1.11). 
 Potential for flexibility (§5.1.12). 
The risks are as follows: 
 The complexity of impact bonds creates novel dimensions of risk (§5.2.1). 
 Measurement of outcomes can be unreliable and controversial (§5.2.2). 
 Costs of establishment are high (§5.2.3). 
 The drive to cost-effectiveness could incentivise poor quality services (§5.2.4). 
 Vulnerable to policy reform and shifting government priorities (§5.2.5). 
                                                        
16 The following section draws on the following reports: Laura Callanan, Jonathan Law, and Lenny Mendonca, 
“From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact Bonds to the U.S.” (McKinsey & Company, May 2012), 
http://mckinseyonsociety.com/social-impact-bonds/; Jenesa Jeram and Bryce Wilkinson, “Investing for 
Success: Social Impact Bonds and the Future of Public Services” (Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Initiative, 2015); 
Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha, “The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds”; Emily Gustafsson-
Wright and Sophie Gardiner, “Policy Recommendations for the Applications of Impact Bonds: A Summary of 
Lessons from the First Five Years of Experience Worldwide” (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 
November 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-potential-and-limitations-of-impact-bonds-
lessons-from-the-first-five-years-of-experience-worldwide/; Annie Dear et al., “Social Impact Bonds: The Early 
Years” (Social Finance, July 2016); Lindsay Beck, Catarina Schwab, and Anna Pinedo, “Social Impact Bonds: 
What’s in a Name?,” Stanford Social Innovation Review, October 12, 2016, 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/social_impact_bonds_whats_in_a_name. 
  14 
 
5.1: Advantages 
 
§5.1.1: Risk is displaced from the public sector to private investors. 
By issuing bonds based on pay-for-performance contracts, the government reallocates a variable 
degree of financial risk onto private sector investors. Specifically, governments (or other issuers) pay 
for outcomes, not services, so the risk of not achieving outcomes falls upon private sector investors. 
By contrast, with conventional output-based contracts, the risk that service providers will fail to 
achieve outcomes is carried by the public money that is paid for the service. (Note that this 
displacement of risk must be weighed against the novel risks that the SIB structure incurs, especially 
the risks of failed implementation; see §5.2.1) 
In regards to permanent forest planting, this is a potential advantage over the Afforestation Grant 
Scheme (AGS). Under the AGS, grants are awarded if forest is planted according to certain 
specifications—but this in itself is no guarantee of success. There are grounds to recoup public 
subsidies if the grantee has demonstrably failed to “[t]ake all reasonable steps to protect the Forest... 
from loss, damage or destruction” (Afforestation Grant Scheme Agreement [5.1a]). But recouping 
carries uncertainties and efforts that the pay-for-performance mechanism circumvents.  
 
§5.1.2: Auditing and monitoring are built into the funding structure. 
There is a growing demand within government to demonstrate links between policy and outcomes, 
justified on the grounds that the public expects greater efficacy and efficiency from tax-funded 
programmes. This pursuit for fiscal accountability has resulted in the growth of agencies and 
mechanisms that monitor, audit and evaluate the outcomes of public service provision. 
A strength of EIBs is that the pay-for-performance contracts ensure that monitoring and evaluation 
is built into service delivery. The methods for doing this are pre-arranged as part of the contract 
agreement, then monitored continually when service provision starts, with strong incentives to closely 
monitor outcomes given the direct connection between measurement and payment. By contrast, 
conventional monitoring and evaluation programmes are often retrospectively imposed on existing 
policies, often by external agencies. This means that appropriate methodologies will be developed 
post hoc, relevant feedback will be delayed, and independent budgets will be required. 
 
§5.1.3: Emphasis on measurement, cause and effect. 
Impact bonds are informationally rich, because the process of determining, measuring and achieving 
impact targets will produce unique data about what works and what is most effective. This knowledge 
could be transferrable to other programmes, including conventional public funding of services or 
outputs. In regards to an EIB for permanent forest planting, the monitoring of conventional and 
innovative planting regimes will generate information about what trees work on what sites, which 
planting regimes succeed, where costs can be cut, and so on. This can inform planting projects 
undertaken by Department of Conservation and Ministry for the Environment.  
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The flipside of this informational richness is that EIBs require a lot of information upfront to inform 
the decisions and risk assessments of investors, service providers, and bond issuers. Fortunately, as 
noted earlier in Box 4, EIBs can draw upon a large existing repository of data and technologies from 
environmental monitoring and evaluation to support conventional policies and obligations at the 
central and local government levels. 
 
§5.1.4: Emphasis on long-term outcomes. 
Impact bonds take several years to mature. More broadly, Climate Bonds Initiative notes that 70% 
of climate-aligned bonds have tenors (time-to-maturity) of 10 years or more.17 This lack of liquidity 
will be unattractive to some investors. It also invites political risks because governments and 
government priorities could change before the bond matures (see §5.2.5).  
However, from a policy perspective, it is advantageous that impact bonds are designed to 
demonstrate continued effectiveness over long-term timescales, not just short-term effects. For 
permanent forest, this is valuable, because saplings generally take several years to successfully 
establish themselves. Only after a period of, say, five years could young trees be said to be mature 
enough to survive without continued weed and pest control. Also, the longer lasting the bond, the 
more diverse the possibilities for additional revenue to feed into its capital returns, such as carbon 
offsetting and selective timber extraction. Relevantly, in the Afforestation Grant Scheme, the 
government claims ownership of resultant carbon credits for the first ten years, which indicates the 
kinds of timeframes that are relevant for carbon sequestration (see Appendix 2). 
 
§5.1.5: Potential for long-term fiscal savings from future avoided costs. 
It is noted that impact bonds are well-suited to preventative activities. Common themes for SIBs are 
reducing rates of recidivism, reducing homelessness, or preventing truancy. Accordingly, a key 
economic justification for bonds is the avoidance of future costs. Present expenditure is justified if the 
sum cost of intervening is less than the sum cost of not intervening. Because target problems can 
persevere for years or decades, these future costs will aggregate to significant sums (discount rates 
notwithstanding). 
This is well-suited to environmental problems, because it is a feature of many environmental 
problems (such as climate change) that costs are cumulative and time-delayed. As discussed in Section 
1, an obstacle to dealing rationally with environmental problems is that costs are externalised, 
unaccounted for by the decision makers whose economic activities are causing the environmental 
harms. Instead the costs are borne elsewhere, such as through the depreciation of natural assets, or 
lost revenue by other users of a natural resource, or as harms inflicted upon future peoples. The 
nature of environmental problems, therefore, is well-suited to justifications of impact.   
 
§5.1.6: The provision of upfront capital is part of the instrument. 
                                                        
17 Climate Bonds Initiative, “Bonds and Climate Change: The State of the Market in 2016” (Climate Bonds 
Initiative & HSBC Climate Change Centre of Excellence, July 2016), 5. 
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What makes an impact bond not merely a pay-for-performance contract is that it delivers capital 
upfront to service providers. This is particularly useful where service providers lack the necessary 
resources and where opportunities for revenue are delayed.  
This is advantageous for permanent forest planting, because the costs for establishing and protecting 
forest can be significant, while reliable revenue opportunities will take years or decades to mature. It 
is also preferable to the Afforestation Grant Scheme, where payment from Government is only 
triggered after forest has been established (see Appendix 2). 
 
§5.1.7: Potential for greater innovation and more cost-effective service provision. 
Pay-for-performance contracts proscribe only outcomes, not how service providers are to deliver 
those outcomes. This creates the freedom to innovate, to find new and effective ways to deliver 
services. Although innovation might not occur, because private investors bear the risk of unsuccessful 
innovation, it is nevertheless an option because service providers are not constrained by output-based 
contracts. A Brookings Institute survey of 38 SIBs found that although none deployed an 
unprecedented method of service delivery, many applied methods in new and different settings, or in 
unique combinations.18  
Governments and government departments, by contrast, are constrained from innovation because 
of their vulnerability to political risk. In the case of a failed impact bond, however, the costs are borne 
by private investors, thereby shielding government from public scrutiny. With this freedom to 
experiment, it is anticipated that services can be delivered at a lower cost than government 
departments could deliver it. 
 
§5.1.8: Potential to harness expertise and reputation of private investors and 
intermediaries. 
A distinguishing feature between conventional government contracts and impact bonds is the 
relationship that service providers establish with private sector investors, actuaries, and other 
intermediaries. These relationships are not only an opportunity for capital investment, but also for 
expertise in fiscal and institutional management, business and entrepreneurial acumen, skills in 
communications and marketing, contacts and networks, reputational integrity, and more. This could 
also be advantageous if the relationship between government and the target community is fractious, 
because intervention might be more readily welcomed when delivered by private sector organisations 
with name recognition among target populations. This could be an asset for permanent forest 
planting, if landowners are wary of interventions and land use allocations by government. 
 
§5.1.9: Potential for scalability. 
The establishment of impact bonds can be costly, time-consuming and labour intensive (see §5.2.3). 
However, these high initial establishment costs can be justified if the delivery model is successful and 
can be scaled up or replicated.  
                                                        
18 Gustafsson-Wright and Gardiner, “The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds,” 43. 
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This is a virtue in the context of afforestation in New Zealand, because the land available for future 
forest is large. The Ministry for Primary Industries identifies an afforestation target of at least 1.1 
million hectares of highly erosion prone marginal land. Yet existing projects do not have the requisite 
scale. The Afforestation Grant Scheme, for example, targets only 15,000 hectares of new forest by 
2020, which is only 1.36 per cent of the 1.1-million-hectare problem identified by Ministry for the 
Environment. Another scheme, the Erosion Control Funding Programme (formerly the East Coast 
Forestry Project), will deal to only 6.45 per cent of this national problem once complete. But expanding 
the EIB would require merely issuing new bonds with the same proven structure. Also, because an EIB 
for permanent forest planting would be world-pioneering, there is potential that this model could be 
exported elsewhere to countries facing similar problems, particularly those countries in South America 
and Southeast Asia that have experienced dramatic deforestation in recent decades. 
 
§5.1.10: Potential for more successful achievement of outcomes. 
A common hypothesis for impact bonds is that pay-for-performance contracts are more likely than 
output-based contracts to achieve outcomes. In light of the novelty of these instruments and the thin 
empirical record, this is offered only as a hypothesis here.19 A New Zealand Initiative report claims 
that “better outcomes are more likely to be achieved”—yet this appears to grounded in a presumption 
that financial incentives work.20 In light of general research on human motivation, there is reason to 
doubt that this presumption is generally true, even though it could be true in specific situations.21 The 
major virtue of impact bonds is not that success is more likely, but that failure doesn’t need to be paid 
for. A strict focus on financial incentives, moreover, could neglect the influence of other motivations, 
which are especially relevant for permanent forests give the various non-economic reasons for 
planting—such as reasons of health and community cited by conservation groups, or the duty of 
kaitiakitanga among Māori. 
 
§5.1.11: Potential to harness philanthropic and prosocial motivations among investors. 
Not all investors will find the EIB structure attractive, given the allocation of risk, the  delayed 
returns, and lack of liquidity. However the explicit focus on environmental outcomes—and the 
reputational value that comes with the class of “green bonds” and “climate-aligned bonds”—will be 
highly attractive to impact investors and other socially responsible retail investors. For philanthropic 
investors, it could be attractive that investors receive even a modest return on investments, rather 
than simply provide donations with no expectation of return. It could also be attractive to pioneer a 
new asset class that delivers environmental outcomes. These attractions could outweigh the 
necessary compromises in other areas, such as risk, returns and secondary liquidity. Indeed, this has 
been the case for Social Impact Bonds: “Most investors in the early transactions are foundations and 
impact investors who have a higher tolerance for the risk associated with engaging early in this market, 
alongside a desire to see complex social problems addressed effectively.”22 
                                                        
19 For some analysis, see ibid., 44. 
20 Jeram and Wilkinson, “Investing for Success: Social Impact Bonds and the Future of Public Services,” 7. 
21 Dan Ariely et al., “Large Stakes and Big Mistakes,” Review of Economic Studies 76 (2009): 451–69. 
22 Dear et al., “Social Impact Bonds: The Early Years,” 27. 
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Large-scale institutional investors, such as pension funds, are initially unlikely to accept such 
compromises because of their fiduciary duties to shareholders. However, a stakeholder workshop on 
forest finance notes: “Forest bonds should target impact and socially responsible investors initially, 
while the market develops, then begin to target institutional investors as the forest bond market 
deepens. A tranche structure with different risk/return profiles could also be used to simultaneously 
appeal to both groups.”23 By emphasising the environmental value of the bond, this could also 
alleviate the need for interest rates or coupons that are competitive with conventional kinds of 
investment.  
 
§5.1.12: Potential for flexibility. 
A major asset for impact bonds is the potential for tailoring targets to meet the expectations and 
demands of specific stakeholders. In the case of permanent forest, this is important because the bond 
can be adapted to different localities and geographic regions, where the likelihood of meeting targets 
are different. Carbon sequestration, for example, occurs more slowly in the southern regions of New 
Zealand than the northern regions; so targets will need to be geographically sensitive (as for the 
Emissions Trading Scheme look-up tables). Similarly, if contractors and investors wish to experiment 
with mixed native/exotic transitional regimes, this could be accommodated within the contract. 
 
5.2: Risks 
 
§5.2.1: The complexity of impact bonds creates novel dimensions of risk. 
Impact bonds involve multiple contracts that connect together multiple parties. Although impact 
bonds purport to shift risk onto the private sector and away from public funds, their complexity 
introduces a further risk that the lengthy and laborious establishment process will be prematurely 
aborted because relevant parties cannot agree on the various attributes of the bond. These attributes 
include acceptable levels of risks and returns, what outcomes should be contracted for, how outcomes 
will be measured, and the establishment of mutual confidence among the multiple contracting 
parties. These risks can be mitigated however by ensuring a simple structure, by ensuring trust and 
transparency between contracting parties, and striving for wide political endorsement. 
 
§5.2.2: Measurement of outcomes can be unreliable and controversial. 
Due to the complexity of the problems that impact bonds tend to address, it can be difficult to isolate 
confounding variables and their causal effects on outcomes. The problem of separating out causal 
influences is certainly less intractable for environmental bonds than for social bonds, because natural 
processes are more amenable to description in terms of general laws than social phenomena. 
However, explanation of environmental outcomes is still complex. Measuring sediment levels in a 
                                                        
23 Cranford et al., “Unlocking Forest Bonds: A High-Level Workshop on Innovative Finance for Tropical Forests,” 
7. 
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river, for example, could be affected by unpredicted and unobserved events along the river that are 
unrelated to the intervention being monitored. 
The best response is to strive for simplicity in design, especially in identifying outcomes and impact 
targets. A 2015 survey of existing impact bonds noted that “choosing the simplest set of outcomes 
and metrics possible makes the resulting SIB program significantly easier to operate. Simple metrics 
provide a clear focus for the service provider and reduce resources needed for evaluation. Although a 
simple metric may not capture every outcome that matters to all actors, a measure that is a proxy for 
other meaningful outcomes could be sufficient.”24 
 
§5.2.3: Costs of establishment are high. 
Given the complexity of impact bonds, they are relatively resource intensive to establish. At least 
initially, these establishment costs could outweigh any cost-savings from the application. In regards 
to SIBs, the New Zealand Initiative notes: “It is more likely that at least in the short term, the main 
benefit from SIBs will come from achieving better social outcomes, rather than fiscal savings. The 
transaction costs of SIBs could be high relative to the amount of capital raised, particularly in the early 
stages of their development.”25 In regards to EIBs specifically, there is reason to believe that 
transaction costs can be reduced somewhat if the EIB can free-ride on existing systems for 
environmental monitoring, rather than invent new systems from scratch. Moreover, as discussed 
above in §5.1.9, the vast scale of potential permanent forest planting, as well as the scale of costs 
avoided, could justify these high initial establishment costs. 
 
§5.2.4: The drive to cost-effectiveness could incentivise poor quality services. 
 A long-standing critique of outcome-oriented contracting is that it incentivises contractors to game, 
cheat or otherwise manipulate the achievement of outcomes. Service providers are suspected of 
ticking boxes, of doing the bare minimum to achieve targets, instead of delivering substantive impacts. 
This is a risk that cannot be ruled out for permanent forest planting—but it can be mitigated through 
a judicious selection of indicators. For example, if service providers cut corners in regards to planting 
methods, or using low-quality stock, or failing to provide sufficient aftercare, then the forest is likely 
to suffer higher mortality rates. But mortality rates, or at least minimal levels of tree density after five 
years, can be among the performance impact targets used to trigger repayments. In other words, as 
long as sensible targets are selected, then cutting corners only increases risks to investors, so there is 
an intrinsic incentive not to do so and to deliver outcomes with integrity. 
 
§5.2.5: Vulnerable to policy reform and shifting government priorities. 
The involvement of government in impact bonds, as well as the long repayment cycle, makes impact 
bonds vulnerable to political risks. The Peterborough Prison Bond is a prominent example (see Section 
4): it was cancelled because of nationwide reforms to ex-offender rehabilitation policy. Another 
source of risk is partisanship: if an opposition party has an ideological or principled objection to impact 
                                                        
24 Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha, “The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds,” 29. 
25 Jeram and Wilkinson, “Investing for Success: Social Impact Bonds and the Future of Public Services,” 7. 
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funding, then there is a risk that the impact bond will be abandoned or undermined if that party 
subsequently comes to power. Assuring cross-party support for impact bonds will do much to provide 
confidence for investors.  
While impact bonds can potentially be held hostage to the competing demands of parliamentary 
sovereignty and policy longevity, it should also be recognised that these risks are not unique to impact 
bonds. These risks are relevant to other kinds of government contract also, although these risks are 
conventionally borne by service providers rather than investors. 
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6: A Preliminary Indication of Expenses, Revenue and 
Avoided Costs. 
 
Please note: The following section is not written to establish the economic case for planting 
permanent forest. Such a case would require a more comprehensive analysis of the opportunity costs 
for alternative land uses, particularly dairy farming. This section is written simply to demonstrate that 
an economic case can be made, by indicating the kinds of expenses, revenue streams and avoided costs 
that might be invoked in negotiations.  
 
The Permanent Forest Bond will bridge the gap between untapped private capital and the unrealised 
environmental benefits of permanent forest.  
The benefits of permanent forest are predicted by scientists on the basis of empirical observation 
and general knowledge about natural systems.26 An ecosystem services approach can then be 
employed to value environmental interventions, or to put a price on the costs of not intervening.27 
For example, Barry et al. estimate that the total value of avoided erosion into perpetuity from future 
forest on 2.47 million hectares of erosion-prone land  is NZ$3.6 billion.28 On average, this works out 
to $1578.95 per hectare. Avoided costs of this kind can then be integrated into the long-term decision 
making of the Crown, because it is a trans-generational institution that bears both the immediate and 
long-term costs. To put the same point differently, the Crown that eventually bears the cost of lost 
productivity from future environmental degradation is the same Crown that could choose to invest 
today in obviating that degradation and subsequently benefit from long-term prosperity. It can 
therefore justify so-called Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES).29 
The challenge for the Permanent Forest Bond is to secure enough revenue and ecosystem services 
to outweigh the expected costs of initial forest establishment. It is not plausible here to provide a 
comprehensive survey of expenditure and revenue, partly because this will be determined by 
negotiating the Bond itself, the results of which cannot be anticipated in advance. However, it is 
                                                        
26 For review, see Kate G. McAlpine and Debra M. Wotton, “Conservation and the Delivery of Ecosystem 
Services: A Literature Review,” Science for Conservation (Wellington, NZ: Department of Conservation, 2009); 
Robert B. Allen et al., “New Zealand’s Indigenous Forests and Shrublands,” in Ecosystem Services in New 
Zealand—condition and Trends. (Lincoln, NZ: Manaaki Whenua Press, 2013), 34–48; Lin Roberts et al., “The 
Nature of Wellbeing: How Nature’s Ecosystem Services Contribute to the Wellbeing of New Zealand and New 
Zealanders” (Wellington, NZ: Department of Conservation, 2015), 
http://www.doc.govt.nz/upload/documents/science-and-technical/sap258entire.pdf. 
27 Gretchen C. Daily et al., “Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human Societies by Natural Ecosystems,” 
Issues in Ecology, no. 2 (1997): 1–18; Robert Costanza et al., “The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and 
Natural Capital,” Ecological Economics 25, no. 1 (April 1998): 3–15; Natural Capital Declaration, “Towards 
Including Natural Resource Risks in Cost of Capital: State of Play and the Way Forward” (Natural Capital 
Declaration, November 2015). 
28 Luke E. Barry et al., “Enhancing Ecosystem Services through Afforestation: How Policy Can Help,” Land Use 
Policy 39 (July 2014): 139. 
29 B. Kelsey Jack, Carolyn Kousky, and Katharine R. E. Sims, “Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services: 
Lessons from Previous Experience with Incentive-Based Mechanisms,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 105, no. 28 (July 15, 2008): 9465–70. 
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possible to indicate the sorts of costs and benefits that negotiations could involve, which is done in 
Table 1 below.  
It is also worth noting that spatial economic tools are currently being developed to assess the net 
value of forests inclusive of ecosystem services. For example, the Forest Investment Framework (FIF) 
will account not only for standard costs and revenues from planted forests, but also water quality 
(avoided nitrate leaching), water supply, recreation, and biodiversity conservation.30 Similarly, an 
online land use tool, dNITRO, is being developed by Toitu te Waonui Limited which provides a cost-
benefit analysis of land use change to mānuka forest and/or Pinus radiata in the Lake Rotorua area, 
and factors in carbon credits, nitrogen allowances and afforestation grants. Such technologies could, 
in time, be adapted for land use decisions on permanent forest. 
But an important point needs to be made: when considering potential revenue streams, there is a 
trade-off to be made with complexity. As identified in §5.2.1 and §5.2.2, the potential complexity of 
impact bonds is a major source of structural risk. As layered capital structures, impact bonds involve 
contracts with multiple parties across public and private sectors, mediated through sophisticated 
systems for monitoring and evaluation. From this perspective, it is prudent to favour simplicity in 
designing impact bonds, by favouring a streamlined set of uncontroversial targets and measures, and 
involving as few contracting parties as possible. From the perspective of generating revenue, however, 
there is an incentive to include multiple impacts, because this widens the field of outcome funders 
who might pay for outcomes. But this requires further sets of contracts and measurement 
frameworks, each inviting new dimensions of risk.  
In short, the demands of risk mitigation and revenue generation pull in two different directions. So 
a major design challenge for the Permanent Forest Bond is to strike the right balance: on the one 
hand, to establish enough reliable contracts that investors will see attractive rates of interest on 
repayment, while on the other hand not inviting so much complexity that it renders the financial 
instrument vulnerable to contingency and controversy.  
  
                                                        
30 Richard T. Yao et al., “Validation and Enhancement of a Spatial Economic Tool for Assessing Ecosystem 
Services Provided by Planted Forests,” Forest Policy and Economics, New Frontiers of Forest Economics: Forest 
Economics beyond the Perfectly Competitive Commodity Markets, 72 (November 2016): 122–31. 
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Table 1: Indicative expenditure, revenue and avoided costs from permanent forest establishment in New Zealand. 
  
 Item Notes Cost (all prices in $NZ) 
Expenditure Trees —Saplings 
—Cuttings 
—Seeds 
—Variable due to location, economies of scale, and stems per hectare. 
—$4–10 per sapling (including labour). 
Fencing —Fencing to manage farm stock and pests —Variable costs due to site location, existing fencing, stock types & likely pests. 
Labour  —Planning & organisation 
—Site preparation (weeding, fencing, etc.) 
—Planting 
—Aftercare (weed & pest control, fence 
repair, etc.) 
— Variable costs due to site access, remoteness, steepness, & presence of weeds & 
herbivorous pests. 
Transport —Transport for saplings and labour — Variables include site access, remoteness, & existing roading. 
Annual fixed 
costs 
—Rates and insurance for forest loss (fire, 
wind event, disease, etc.) 
—Variable depending on region. 
 
Revenue Carbon credits —Provision of NZUs through Permanent 
Forest Sink Initiative or Emissions Trading 
Scheme. 
—Provision of alternative carbon credits for 
voluntary carbon market. 
—Current price of NZU of $17–19 per tonne.  
—Projected carbon price at 2030 of $152 per tonne assuming a global low-carbon 
transition, or $104 per tonne assuming domestic transition to renewable energy and EV 
uptake, or $56 per tonne assuming Tiwai Point shutdown (MBIE 2016; IEA World Energy 
Outlook 2015). 
—Carbon stock in non-soil pools from planted forests (2008): $148–$22,749 per 
hectare, assuming a carbon price of $0.19–29.24 per tonne (Barry et al. 2013). 
Honey 
production 
—Use of transitional mānuka forest for honey 
production. 
—Bulk honey price for mānuka honey: $9.50–$116.50 per kg in 2015, up from $7–
$37.50 in 2010 (MPI 2015). 
Timber revenue —Selective felling of forest under permanent 
canopy cover rules. 
—Felling of transitional/nursery crops as 
interim income. 
—For emerging work on the economic viability of native forestry, see Quinlan (2011). 
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Recreation —Paid access to forest for walking, biking, 
etc. 
Willingness to pay for recreational opportunities in planted/native forests: $34–67 per 
visit (Dhakal et al 2012). 
 
Avoided 
costs 
Soil erosion —Agricultural production loss 
—Farm infrastructure loss 
—Direct private property damage 
—Road/rail infrastructure damage 
—Utility network damage 
—Recreational facility damage 
—Loss of visual amenity 
—Other soil erosion effects (damage to wāhi 
tapu, loss of farmer confidence, etc.) 
—Total value of avoided erosion into perpetuity from future forest on 2.47 million 
hectares of erosion-prone land: $3.6 billion (Barry et al 2014). 
—Avoided erosion value from 2.9 million hectares of erosion prone land: $250 million 
per year (Barry et al 2013). 
—Average annual cost of soil erosion and sedimentation combined: $127 million 
although true value likely to be higher. Lost agricultural production alone is estimated 
at $37 million annually (Krausse et al 2001). 
—Net present value of soil conservation (for erosion and sedimentation): at least $2.7 
million at internal rate of return of 11.3% (Weber et al 1992). 
—One-off costs of June 2015 storm in Taranaki/Horizons: total cost of $68.9 million 
with up to 800 properties impacted. Majority of impact on sheep and beef farms ($57.6 
million) with $37 million in infrastructure damage and $20.6 million in production 
losses (MPI 2015). 
Sedimentation 
and water 
quality 
—Cost of filtering drinking water 
—Increased cost of processing from machine 
wear and efficiency losses 
—Loss of recreation (fishing, boating, 
swimming, etc.) 
—Water storage loss (reservoirs and dams) 
—Navigation (cost of dredging ports and 
channels) 
—Reticulation (irrigation/hydro canals, 
drainage ditches) 
—Biodiversity loss (degradation of freshwater 
and estuarine ecosystems) 
—Other sediment effects (dust nuisance, loss 
of community confidence, etc.) 
—Sedimentation costs are difficult to generalise beyond specific events or catchments 
(see Blaschke et al 2008) 
—The commercial asset value for snapper stocks, whose spawning is threatened by 
sedimentation in estuaries like the Kaipara Harbour: $262 million in 2009 (Statistics NZ 
2010) 
—Annual value of water quality improvement from existing planted forests in the 
Hawkes Bay: $29 million per year (Barry et al 2013). 
—Total cost of Ministry for the Environment’s nine clean-up projects of polluted lakes 
and rivers (includes Lake Taupō, Rotorua Te Arawa Lakes, and Manawatu River): $272.6 
million; Crown contribution is $122.2 million. 
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Water volume 
 
—Insured loss (flood costs for public or 
private insurance) 
—Production loss 
 
—Cost to insurers from flood damages from 1995–2004: NZ$247 million excluding 
government compensation payments (Bicknell et al. 2004). 
—Cost to insurers from weather-related events, largely flooding, in 2015: $115 million 
including $50 million for June 2015 storm in Manawatu/Horizons (Insurance Council of 
New Zealand 2016). 
Air quality —Filtration of particulates. 
—Reduced respiratory disease and associated 
public health expenditure. 
—Health benefits from reduced exposure to PM10 particulates in Christchurch air: 
$19.2 million (Cavanagh 2008). 
— Value of improved air quality from planting for Project Twin Streams in Waitakere: 
$1.8–4 million (Vesely 2009). 
Biodiversity —Loss of unique indigenous species and 
habitats. 
—Willingness to pay for improved provision of habitat for native species in public 
forests: NZ$95 per year per household (Yao and Kaval 2010). 
Loss of “clean 
green” market 
reputation 
—General degradation of 100% Pure brand 
due to damage of environmental reputation. 
—Added value to dairy exports from perceptions of environmental non- degradation in 
Asian, African, Indian, and Middle Eastern export markets: $241–569 million (Ministry 
for the Environment 2001). 
—Added value to tourism from perceptions of environmental non-degradation: $530–
780 million (Ministry for the Environment 2001). 
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7: What Would a Permanent Forest Bond in New 
Zealand Look Like? 
 
The proposed Permanent Forest Bond is an alignment of interests between three stakeholders: 
investors, contractors and the Crown. Two other parties are required to facilitate this contractual 
arrangement: an intermediary and an evaluator. (See Figure 2 below.) 
 
 
Figure 2: Schema for a Permanent Forest Bond 
 
The first group of stakeholders is investors who want to invest in positive environmental outcomes. 
This can include both institutional investors like banks and pension funds, and smaller-scale retail 
investors who . 
The second is the contractors – typically called service providers in the context of SIBs – in this case 
the prospective forest planters who lack the upfront capital to plant permanent native forest. 
The third party is the outcome funder, which in this case is the Crown (although the Crown could 
partner with other beneficiaries of permanent forest outcomes as discussed below). The ultimate 
interest of the Crown is to avoid the future costs of environmental degradation, as well as future 
carbon liabilities for purchasing foreign carbon credits to meet international emissions reduction 
targets. Although this is economically rational for the Crown over the very long run, the Crown also 
has more proximate interests in functioning as cost effectively as possible. This is the appeal of the 
Permanent Forest Bond, which promises to provide the service of forest planting more time- and cost-
effectively by involving the private sector rather than direct intervention from the Crown itself. 
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These stakeholders are coordinated by two other actors: the intermediary and the evaluator. 
Typically, the intermediary determines the feasibility of outcomes, structures the deal, identifies 
contractors, and raises and distributes capital by working with investors and outcomes funders. 
Meanwhile, the evaluator monitors and assesses whether contractors succeed in meeting the relevant 
performance impact targets (see §7.1 below). If these targets are met, then payment to investors is 
triggered in accordance with the pay-for-performance contracts. According to measured impacts, 
investors will experience either a loss of principal, a return of principal, or a return of principal plus 
coupon. The bond maturity can be set for a timeframe when tree mortality is low (say, 5–8 years). 
Additionally, there might be a system of interim payments at key milestones. 
The schema above leaves a lot undetermined. For the purposes of this working paper, this is proper, 
because the detail of the Permanent Forest Bond can only be specified through the process of 
negotiation. However, for the purposes of shedding light on what the bond might look like, the 
following subsections discuss some of the options that negotiators must settle on:  
 
§7.1: The selection of impact targets. 
Ultimately, the most critical task is to identify impact targets that will trigger payment from the pay-
for-performance contracts. These targets need to be unambiguous enough to forestall disputes and 
contestation among parties, yet also open enough to invite innovation and cost-effective delivery of 
outcomes. They also need to be supported by evidence, or investors won’t have the confidence to 
purchase the bonds.  
There is no a priori solution to the question of targets, because their final selection must emerge 
from negotiations among stakeholders. However, targets such as these below could form the basis of 
negotiations: 
 x-number of native tree stems per hectare (or part thereof) after five or ten years;31 
 volume of carbon per hectare (or part thereof) after five or ten years; 
 improvements to the Fish Spawning Indicator being developed for the National 
Environmental Standard for Plantation Forestry;  
 improvements to erosion susceptibility, perhaps using existing models such as NZeem® 
(New Zealand Empirical Erosion Model); 
 reduced sedimentation in associated waterways, either by empirical measures or numerical 
models; 
 reduced presence of nutrients (phosphorous, nitrates) in associated waterways. 
                                                        
31 Depending on stakeholder ambitions, stems per hectare could be specified as native or endemic species, or 
left open to include exotics. Alternatively, a Permanent Forest Bond could allow split targets for native/exotic 
species that can accommodate transitional regimes, where a nursery crop of fast-growing exotics (such as 
eucalytpus or paulownia) is interplanted with an understorey of natives (such as various podocarps). So 
although standard conservation planting might recommend 2,500 stems per hectare for forest planting, the 
Permanent Forest Bond could set a low target of 1,000 native stems per hectare alongside a total target of 
2,500 stems per hectare (natives or exotics), allowing investors and contractors to choose what is the most 
effective regime. 
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The key virtue here, as discussed earlier, is simplicity. Simple targets that are easy and 
uncontroversial to measure will reduce evaluation costs, as well as reduce the risk of dispute among 
contracting parties. 
 
§7.2: Choosing an evaluator. 
Another issue to be determined is who should play the role of evaluator. To build confidence and 
trust among contracting parties, it is preferable to secure a third-party evaluator who can determine 
measurements impartially and arbitrate disputes. This is the inference in the simplified schema above 
(Figure 2). 
However, as a Brookings Institute report notes, there is substantial variation among existing impact 
bonds over who occupies roles and how the roles are structured.32 Occasionally, contracting parties 
are involved in more than one role. Notably, it is not unusual for outcome funders to have at least a 
secondary role in evaluation by verifying the initial assessments of evaluators. In regards to the 
Permanent Forest Bond, it is also likely that the Crown’s role as outcome funder will blur with the role 
of evaluation because the Bond will very likely piggyback on existing programmes of environmental 
monitoring which are undertaken by local authorities; or state-funded Crown Research Institutes such 
as NIWA, Scion, Landcare Research, and AgResearch; or by government departments themselves. 
Relevantly for the Permanent Forest Bond, the Ministry for the Environment and Ministry for Primary 
Industries are currently involved in creating a National Environmental Standard for Plantation Forestry 
(NES-PF), which will identify a series of assessment standards which could be adapted for measuring 
the impact of permanent forest planting also. These crossovers will need to navigated by the 
intermediary when defining the evaluation role, in order to ensure impartiality and transparency. 
 
§7.3: Additional outcome funders. 
For simplicity’s sake, this working paper has focused on the Crown as the appropriate entity for 
issuing a Permanent Forest Bond, because it represents the interests of present and future citizens. 
However, there are other stakeholders who could be contracted into the Permanent Forest Bond 
alongside the Crown. Of course, the involvement of additional outcome funders increases the 
complexity of the bond and the risks associated with complexity (see §5.2.1), but it is for negotiators 
to strike the right balance between complexity and funding opportunities. 
 Local authorities: Regional, district and city councils are substantially involved in environmental 
issues. They are the authorities usually responsible for Resource Management Act decisions; they 
are involved in local environmental monitoring; they own environmental assets; and they invest 
in clean-up and environmental remediation projects. Accordingly, local authorities could be 
called upon to contribute to a Permanent Forest Bond given that subsequent forest will increase 
the value of green assets and reduce expenditure on clean-ups. 
 Hydropower generators: Sedimentation is a major issue for hydropower generators—for 
example, damage to turbines—particularly in Waikato and Clutha Rivers. Forest planting around 
                                                        
32 Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha, “The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds,” 23–27. 
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erosion-prone areas and waterway margins could reduce the costs of damage to infrastructure, 
so hydropower generators could contribute ecosystem service payments. 
 Private companies: There are other private companies that could benefit directly from 
permanent forest planting, such as fishing companies that rely on fish stocks unaffected by 
estuarine sedimentation, or tourism ventures that benefit from clean rivers without sediment, or 
recreation companies that wish to invest in future forest. The Permanent Forest Bond could serve 
as a vessel for contributing financially to positive outcomes. 
 Landowners or agriculture businesses: In instances where the Permanent Forest Bond creates 
outcomes that mitigate environmental damage caused by intensive agriculture, there is a case to 
be made that those profiting from agriculture—that is, landowners or agricultural businesses—
should be contributing to payment for such outcomes. Otherwise the bond is subsidising 
polluters, because it removes remedial expenses that the polluters would otherwise have carried 
under regulatory restriction. 
 Insurers and reinsurers: Given the risks to infrastructure and property from vulnerability to 
erosion and land subsidence, insurers and reinsurers have an interest in increasing the resilience 
of land to existing climate risks, as well as heightened risk of extreme weather events under 
conditions of climate change. 
 
§7.4: Ownership. 
Given the long time-horizons of forestry, the issue of forest ownership is always challenging. It is not 
unusual for land ownership titles to be many decades old, and therefore to straddle very different 
legal contexts. The Permanent Forest Bond introduces additional ownership issues in regards to 
intellectual property and carbon credits. How to allocate ownership among stakeholders in the 
Permanent Forest Bond will be critical to the distribution of benefits and, therefore, critical to the 
Bond’s attractiveness to prospective participants. 
Ownership of forest: It is not unusual in plantation forestry for ownership of land and forest to be 
split between different owners, whereby forest operators lease land for establishing forest. A 
fundamental choice is whether the Bond should be designed to align forest ownership with land 
ownership, or whether the Crown should claim ownership of forest in the public interest as the 
principal outcome funder. Given that the public interest referred to here is the carbon and 
environmental benefits of permanent forest to New Zealand, there are also pathways for restricted 
ownership to be considered. For example, although the ownership of the forest could be granted to 
landowners, this could come with clear restrictions against cutting anymore trees than consistent with 
continuous cover forestry. Alternatively, forest ownership by landowners could be paired with 
mandatory registration with a covenant, such as the Permanent Forest Sink Initiative or QEII covenant, 
to best guarantee forest longevity. 
Intellectual property: The Permanent Forest Bond is information rich, generating evidence about 
effective forest practices. Its targeted structure is also designed to promote innovation, to encourage 
investors and contractors to discover the most cost-effective strategies for establishing forest. This 
will provide a competitive edge to contractors in securing future bonds, but it could detrimental to 
the wider aims of afforestation, insofar as new knowledge about best practice isn’t shared among 
other contractors or the wider community. A requirement for open-access or commons licensing 
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would provide the greatest transparency and knowledge dispersion, which could be delayed by a 
period of years in order to reward innovation.  
Carbon credits: An important potential source of revenue for permanent forest is the generation of 
carbon credits to be sold on voluntary carbon markets, or compliance markets like the Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS). Within the context of the Paris Agreement, stakeholders have various interests 
in carbon credits (see Appendix 1 for a discussion of this context). The Crown has an interest in 
acquiring carbon credits to meet its international emissions targets. Private investors have an interest 
in acquiring credits for offsetting their internal emissions, either voluntarily to meet corporate 
sustainability goals or compulsorily as participants in the ETS. Landowners have an interest in acquiring 
carbon credits as a revenue stream for their land. 
The distribution of carbon credits could be carved up in various ways. The following examples are 
provided only to shed light on these possibilities: 
 The Crown wholly acquires the first 10 years of carbon credits (as it does under the 
Afforestation Grant Scheme; see Appendix 2). Thereafter, landowners must compulsorily 
enter the forest into Permanent Forest Sink Initiative and acquire all subsequent credits. 
 The Crown and landowner receive a 50/50 split of carbon credits; then after 10 years the 
landowner acquires an increasing proportion of these credits until s/he acquires all credits 
from 50 years after the forest was established. 
 Investors receive the first 10 years of carbon credits, possibly as a coupon paid on bond 
maturity. This structure would incentivise maximal carbon production. Thereafter, the 
carbon credits are acquired wholly by the Crown, or by the landowner, or split 50/50 
between the Crown and the landowner. 
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8: Conclusion 
 
This working paper concludes that an Environmental Impact Bond model could plausibly be adapted 
to address the challenge of afforestation in New Zealand. A Permanent Forest Bond is technically 
feasible, in certain ways more feasible than the Social Impact Bonds that are currently under 
development in New Zealand. Theses advantages include the pre-existence of established 
conventions for environmental measurement and monitoring; the creation of “hard assets” that can 
generate revenue streams that are well-understood; and the potential avoidance of costs to the 
nation’s long-term prosperity that are large and often quantifiable. 
There is, however, no guarantee that a Permanent Forest Bond would succeed. The reasons for this 
need not be because the model itself is essentially flawed, but because successful implementation 
depend on the contingencies of the actual negotiation process, including the conduct of the parties 
involved and the strength of their commitment to the shared goal of expanding permanent forest.  
Therefore, any practical progress that develops from this working paper must pay careful attention 
to the actual relations between contracting parties. There should be no assumption that the 
plausibility of the Permanent Forest Bond “on paper” will result in its seamless implementation in the 
real world; rather, there should be a careful attendance to the inter-organisational and inter-personal 
dynamics at play in this public/private partnership. These dynamics cannot be solved in advance, but 
they can be anticipated. Ultimately, success will depend on the sound leadership and good judgment 
of the intermediary in coordinating and structuring the deal, as well as the shared commitment to 
success among the contracting parties. Given the long life span of impact bonds, it will also be 
important to secure cross-party political support to reduce the risk of wavering government interest.  
Given the environmental assets at stake, including New Zealand’s freshwater, soil and forest assets, 
the Permanent Forest Bond deserves to be seriously explored as an instrument for improving New 
Zealand’s long-term prosperity. If, however, this instrument is seen as excessively risky, then 
stakeholders—the Crown in particular—owes New Zealand citizens an account of how the problem 
will be solved, if not through public/private partnerships like impact bonds, then through conventional 
output-based interventions on behalf of the public. If nothing else, the EIB model makes clear that 
environmental investments are economically rational from a national and intergenerational 
perspective. These problems ought to be addressed somehow, if not by impact bonds then by some 
other funding model. 
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Appendix 1: The International Context 
 
An important part of the international context for the Permanent Forest Bond is the growing global 
call for fossil fuel divestment.  
Carbon Tracker Initiative estimates that, to have an 80% probability of staying within 2°C warming, 
60–80% of existing fossil fuel investments must be written off as stranded assets.33 This means 
forfeiting capital expenditure in fossil fuels worth US$2.2 trillion as the fossil fuel market shrinks to fit 
a 2°C carbon budget.34 These estimates have been publicly influential, most prominently through 
transnational environmental activists such as 350.org or localised campaigns that focus on the capital 
investments of universities and other institutions. However, acknowledgement of the problem has 
also come from the mainstream financial establishment, most notably the Bank of England’s governor 
Mark Carney. In a speech to Lloyd’s of London in September 2015, he warned that “a wholesale 
reassessment of prospects, especially if it were to occur suddenly, could potentially destabilise 
markets”. If investors wait to respond to events rather than shift their investments pre-emptively, he 
argued it “may already be too late”.35 These concerns were more recently reiterated by the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which oversees the European Union’s financial system.36 
But where will these investments be shifted to? The call to divest depends upon there being 
alternative investment opportunities with equivalent levels of risk. These need not be green 
investments—but if public pressure over climate change is strong enough, financial markets might 
seek not only to divest from the principal cause of the problem (fossil fuels), but also to re-invest some 
proportion of that capital into solutions to the problem—that is, into renewable energy, low-carbon 
technologies, carbon sinks and so on. Consequently, there is a need for low-risk long-term investment 
alternatives to fossil fuels, especially those that could complement a “green” investment portfolio by 
being low- or negative-emissions. 
At the same time, there is an emerging supply of new financial instruments that meet some of these 
criteria. Climate Bonds Initiative’s State of the Market 2016 report has identified US$694 billion of 
“climate-aligned bonds” currently outstanding, used to finance low carbon and climate-resilient 
infrastructure. Of these climate-aligned bonds, only about 17% are labelled explicitly as “green 
bonds”; the remainder include municipal, and other bonds that finance low-carbon infrastructure 
development, particularly in transport (67% of all climate-aligned bonds) and energy (19%).37 
                                                        
33 Carbon Tracker Initiative and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 
“Unburnable Carbon 2013: Wasted Capital and Stranded Assets” (London, 2013), 
http://www.carbontracker.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Unburnable-Carbon-2-Web-Version.pdf. 
34 Carbon Tracker Initiative, “The $2 Trillion Stranded Assets Danger Zone: How Fossil Fuel Firms Risk Destroying 
Investor Returns” (London: Carbon Tracker Initiative, November 2015), 
http://www.carbontracker.org/report/stranded-assets-danger-zone/. 
35 Pilita Clark, ‘Mark Carney Warns Investors Face “Huge” Climate Change Losses’, Financial Times, 29 September 
2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/622de3da-66e6-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5.html. 
36 European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), “Too Late, Too Sudden: Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy and 
Systemic Risk,” Reports of the Advisory Scientific Committee (Frankfurt, DE: European System of Financial 
Supervision, February 2016). 
37 Climate Bonds Initiative, “Bonds and Climate Change: The State of the Market in 2016” (Climate Bonds 
Initiative & HSBC Climate Change Centre of Excellence, July 2016). 
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There are also public pledges to support this growing asset class. During COP21 in Paris, a group of 
asset owners and investment managers overseeing a combined US$11.2 trillion of assets released the 
Paris Green Bonds Statement which pledged to “scale up investment in green bonds, climate bonds 
and other bonds financing mitigation of and adaptation to climate change that meet out risk and 
return requirements as institutional investors.”38 Climate Bonds Initiative, which co-organised this 
Statement, is currently in the process of developing standards for green bonds, which consists of a 
certification process, pre-issuance requirements, post-issuance requirements and a suite of sector-
specific eligibility and guidance documents. Sector specific standards for solar, wind, low carbon 
buildings, geothermal and low carbon transport are already fully functioning. Standards for water, 
marine, hydropower, bioenergy and land use are currently awaiting board approval after undergoing 
public consultation. 
When it comes to land use, bonds related to agriculture and forestry currently account for only 0.9% 
of outstanding climate-aligned bonds.39 However there is substantial interest in financing forest, not 
only because of its relevance to climate change, but also sustainable development in underdeveloped 
nations. In regards to forest, bonds are regarded as uniquely appropriate instruments, given the large 
scale and long timeframes involved. A high-level stakeholder workshop noted in the subsequent 
report, Unlocking Forest Bonds, that: “The issuance of bonds directly addresses the concerns of time 
and scale, enabling issuers to raise large-scale finance now that will be repaid by existing and 
anticipated future income.”40 
Presently, most attention is paid to the protection of existing older forests, especially for capitalising 
REDD+ mechanisms—that is, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation. In 
essence, private sector capital is provided to communities in order to finance the transition to 
sustainable development pathways, where revenue streams are created to conserve and sustainably 
manage existing forest, rather than removing the forest for unsustainable timber, energy, or land-
clearing for agriculture. Some are designed as payments for ecosystem services (PES), whereby a 
framework of incentives is developed that finances and pays for the environmental value of existing 
forests. 
There is a lesser focus on afforestation/reforestation (or A/R). Afforestation is defined as establishing 
forest on land that was non-forested for the preceding 50 years, whereas reforestation is establishing 
forest on land that was forested within 50 years. A/R are both recognised as potential sources of 
carbon units under the Kyoto Protocol, most relevantly Articles 3.3 and 3.4, which enable countries to 
generate credits through A/R and through Improved Forest Management (or IFM) which increases 
carbon stocks within existing forest. These rules look likely to remain a feature of future international 
climate frameworks; indeed, New Zealand relies on the existence of these rules to purchase carbon 
credits in future decades to offset national emissions. But there are no guarantees. 
There is a tension, however, between New Zealand’s willingness to bind itself to emissions 
reductions targets under the Paris Agreement, yet its reluctance to produce domestic carbon sinks 
                                                        
38 See the Paris Green Bonds Statement at the Climate Bonds Initiative website (last accessed 28/1/2016): 
http://www.climatebonds.net/resources/press-releases/Paris-Green-Bonds-Statement 
39 Climate Bonds Initiative, “Bonds and Climate Change: The State of the Market in 2016,” 4. 
40 M. Cranford et al., “Unlocking Forest Bonds: A High-Level Workshop on Innovative Finance for Tropical 
Forests,” Workshop Report (WWF Forest & Climate Initiative, Global Canopy Programme and Climate Bonds 
Initiative, 2011), 6. 
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that can offset national emissions. Why resign future generations to purchasing offsets at an unknown 
price when we could create our own domestic offsets by establishing permanent forest on marginal 
land? Surely it is cheaper and less risky to long-term national prosperity to create as many carbon 
sinks as possible with whatever land is available. The projected carbon prices used for official planning 
should provide fair warning: a recent MBIE report used 2030 carbon price projections of $56–$152 
per tonne41 while the BusinessNZ Energy Council assumes a 2050 carbon price of $60–$115 by 2050 
for its projections.42 
If New Zealand succeeds in establishing a Permanent Forest Bond, it would be world-pioneering. 
Potentially, it could attract international investors seeking credible green investments or proof of the 
viability of such instruments. Also, the Permanent Forest Bond could be not only scalable within New 
Zealand, but also internationally scalable, replicated in other countries with marginal land that is 
suitable for permanent forest. In particular, it could be deployed by those South American and South 
East Asian countries which have seen mass deforestation in recent decades, yet for economic, 
environmental and climate reasons want to embark on reforestation programmes. 
  
                                                        
41 These projections are derived from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2015. The 2030 
carbon price of $152 per tonne assumes a global low-carbon transition, $104 per tonne assumes domestic 
transition to renewable energy and EV uptake, and $56 per tonne assumes Tiwai Point shutdown. See Ministry 
of Business, Innovation & Employment, “Electricity Demand and Generation Scenarios: Scenario and Results 
Summary” (Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, August 2016), 6. 
42 BusinessNZ Energy Council, Paul Scherrer Institute, PricewaterhouseCoopers NZ, & Sapere Research Group, 
‘New Zealand Energy Scenarios: Navigating Energy Futures to 2050’ (Wellington, NZ: BusinessNZ Energy 
Council, 2015), 37. 
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Appendix 2: Comparison of Afforestation Schemes 
 Environmental Impact 
Bond (EIB) 
Afforestation Grant 
Scheme (AGS) 
Permanent Forest Sink 
Initiative (PFSI) 
 
Upfront 
capital for 
planting 
Yes: upfront transfer of 
capital from investors 
to contractors (via 
intermediary) prior to 
planting. 
No: payment only made 
after site inspection to 
ensure that forest 
meets Minimum 
Established Standard. 
No: delayed revenue 
through selling carbon 
credits generated by 
forest growth. 
Principal 
distribution 
of risk 
Private investors bear 
principal risk of failed 
forest establishment as 
purchasers of targeted 
EIBs. 
Landowners bear 
principal risk of failed 
forest establishment 
until AGS payment is 
made. Government 
bears principal risk 
after AGS payment is 
made.  
 
Landowners bear 
substantial risk for 
failed forest 
establishment, not only 
from lost carbon 
revenue, but also for 
reimbursing carbon 
credits from forest loss. 
 
Flexibility of 
outcomes 
Highly flexible: 
outcomes are specified 
through the setting of 
impact targets through 
negotiation, either 
general or tailored to  
specific locality. 
Moderately flexible: 
planting is constrained 
by Minimum 
Established Standard 
(750 stems per hectare, 
native or exotic, free of 
weed competition). 
Moderately flexible: 
planting of natives or 
exotics is constrained 
by PFSI eligibility 
criteria (forest of >1ha, 
>30m wide, >30% tree 
crown cover, trees >5m 
high). 
Protection 
of forest 
Variable: the date of 
maturity and 
requirements for 
covenanting (or some 
other agreement) will 
be determined by 
negotiation. 
10 years: landowners 
must maintain forest 
for ten years, after 
which there are no 
obligations. 
50 year covenant: 
covenant limits exit for 
50 years and only then 
on surrender of 
equivalent carbon 
credits. Also prohibits 
forest loss for 99 years 
(except for continuous 
cover forestry). 
Relationship 
between 
landowners 
and 
government 
Indirect: landowners 
deal with the EIB’s 
intermediary and non-
governmental 
contractors.  
Direct: landowners 
make grant agreement 
with the Crown. 
Direct: landowners 
enter into covenant 
with the Crown. 
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